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Abstract
Hungary has a unitary government system with 19 counties, 23 “cities with county rank” and 
about 3200 local (municipal) governments. The financial architecture of local governments is 
quite complicated and budget constraints are “halfway” between soft and hard. After an early 
and temporary “municipal bond boom” in the middle of 1990s, the size of indebtedness started 
to increase considerably, first in 2002. By the end of 2011 the size of financial obligations deriv-
ing from local borrowing amounted more than 4.7% of GDP. 
The paper is aimed at examining factors that might have been behind indebtedness and tries 
to separate the effect of internal and external variables for the period between 1990 and 2011. 
According to the results of the empirical analysis local authorities’ borrowing activity cannot be 
explained only with help of quantitative macro-economical indicators such as total sub-national 
revenues, expenditures, CPI and GDP. Namely, the formation of debt was mainly determined 
by behaviour patterns of local governments and by random (unforeseeable) shocks caused 
by changes in central regulation. The short term patterns in borrowing attitude are due to the 
four-year long election cycle of local representatives while adapting to random shock happens 
quickly within one year. Four different time-phases (periods) can be determined, which can be 
described by different characteristics and makes explanation for the formation of local debt: 
early development of subnational debt markets (1990–1995), restriction (1996–1997), modera-
te growth (1998–2006), municipal bond-boom (2007–2010).
Key words: indebtedness, local governments, municipal bond, econometrics model, Hungary
Introduction
Hungary has a unitary government system and the Constitution and the 1990 
Law on Local Authorities establish that the basic rights of all local governments, 
regardless of size, are equal. Thus, the system can be considered as fairly demo-
cratic but very fragmented. The average size of Hungary’s municipalities (in-
cluding Budapest) is very low (about 3000 people) and over half of Hungary’s 
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municipalities have a population below 1000. The financial architecture of local 
governments is quite complicated and budget constraints are “halfway” between 
soft and hard.1
During the process of the transition to a market economy and with the in-
creasing difficulties of the central budget, a greater share of public service provi-
sion has been transferred to the local level. The Act on Local Authorities assigns 
responsibility to local governments for providing public services in an extraordi-
nary large range, even by international comparison. Since transfers from the cen-
tral budget are less and less able to cover the investment needs of local govern-
ments, there is an even stronger demand for external funds that can be satisfied 
first of all, with help of borrowing. The enhancement of the resource-deployment 
capacity of the local authority sector is a fundamental condition for ensuring the 
necessary development resources at the local level.
The really drastic increase in volume of local government debt in Hungary 
started in 2006, caused primarily by the issuance of local government bonds. At 
the end of 2011 the size of financial obligations deriving from local borrowing 
amounted more than 4.7% of GDP.
Figure 1. Liabilities (municipal bonds, short and long term loans) of Hungarian local govern-
ments in the percentage of GDP and local governments’ revenues (1990–2010)
Source: own construction based on Hungarian National Bank’s data.
The paper is aimed at examining factors that might have been behind in-
debtedness, and tries to separate the effect of internal and external variables. As 
internal factors I mean first of all the circumstances which refer directly to the 
operation (and financing) of Hungarian local government sector such as central 
regulation of borrowing and central subsidy policy. As external factors mainly 
quantitative variables, which reflects macro-economical situation of Hungary, 
can be taken into account. In the paper I make an attempt to evaluate the role of 
internal and external factors and to determine their explanatory power as well. 
1 Operating deficit may be financed by selling fixed assets and by borrowing as well.
0
10
20
30
40
Debt/GDP
Debt/Revenues
1990 200820061998 2000 20042002 2010199619941992
477Local Indebtedness in Hungary: Experience of 20 Years
Accordingly, after summarizing the theoretical background of local borrowing, 
I try to construct an econometrical model, which can provide sufficient explana-
tion for the changes in local governments’ indebtedness in Hungary.
Theoretical framework for the analyzis
In the first, theoretical part of my paper, I try to summarize the economical 
advantages and disadvantages of local borrowing and to determine the theoreti-
cal framework for the empirical analysis.
Why local borrowing makes sense
Borrowing represents one possible and important way to finance local capital 
projects. The most important arguments for borrowing by local governments and 
against other forms of financing can be summarized as follows:
Long-term debt allows sub-national governments to acquire or build capital 
improvements more quickly than they could on a pay-as-you-go basis. Borrowing 
over time is an effective way to overcome the problem of inequitable burden of 
costs among tax payers. It allows more equitable payment schemes, since users 
can be made to pay for the capital cost of facilities as they are used over time. 
There will be an assurance that the most users will pay for the benefits either 
through local taxes or directly through user charges and hereby an optimal al-
location of resources can be achieved.
Benefits from accelerated local development can overshadow the cost of bor-
rowing. Carrying out the investment as quickly as possible, operational costs 
(related to the given service) can be reduced [Swianiewicz, 2004]. Borrowing 
can also stabilize the required budget resources. The volume of capital spending 
in local government units fluctuates from one year to another. If capital projects 
are financed from current revenues, the demand for resources changes over time 
as well. In countries where a large proportion of local revenues is raised through 
local taxes, an irrational fluctuation of local taxes rates may result.
However, there are also costs and risks in case of borrowing. Long-term 
debt limits a sub-national government’s future budget flexibility. Unwisely 
used, it can burden citizens with high taxes or service charges. Many countries 
permit long-term debt only for capital spending and not for operating deficits 
(sometimes called the “Golden Rule”) [Musgrave, 1959]. Borrowing to meet 
short-term financing needs can provide opportunities for banks and subnational 
governments to develop working relationships and allow bankers to become fa-
miliar with the governments’ financial affairs. Provided that the financing is 
repaid within the budget year and that carrying debt beyond the budget year is 
prohibited, there is no a priori reason to limit such financing to capital spending 
[Freire, Petersen, 2004].
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Management of local government debt
The most common approaches concerning management and regulation of local 
debt include (1) leaving financial market discipline to operate freely; (2) estab-
lishing strict administrative, case-by-case control; and (3) establishing explicit, 
pre-emptive and legally binding general rules to prevent crises and encourage 
good market behaviour [Oliveira, Martin-Vazquez, 2001].
Even where restrictions on local borrowing seem to be strict the constraints 
may in fact be softer than they appear since municipal governments can be accus-
tomed to circumvent such restrictions by borrowing through quasi-fiscal institu-
tions or publicly-owned enterprises which they control [Spahn, 1999].
A principal task of debt management is to design an optimal debt profile that 
is consistent with the sub-sovereign’s overall economic policy and that minimiz-
es the cost given a prudent level of risk. The debt profile refers to the level of debt 
(total amount outstanding) and the structure of debt (domestic vs. foreign, fixed 
vs. floating interest rate, and long-term vs. short-term debts) [de la Torre, Freire, 
Huertas, 1999]. The most useful key indicators are: (1) the ratio of debt service to 
recurring revenues; (2) the ratio of total outstanding debt to GDP; (3) the ratio of 
total debt to the local tax base; (4) the ratio of total debt per capita.
Econometrical analysis of Hungarian local governments’ 
borrowing
In order to analyze and explain local government’s borrowing first the related 
quantitative data were collected. Directly quarterly data were available indica-
ting local authorities’ net borrowing (new debt issued minus repayments) as the 
sum of short term and long term loans and short term and long term securities 
(municipal bonds). 
As it can be seen in the chart there was considerable quarterly seasonality 
present in borrowing activity. This statement could be proofed by testing the 
significance of autocorrelation coefficients. At 5% level of significance only the 
simple and partial autocorrelation coefficient related to lag 4 were significant 
meaning that borrowing patterns are connected to quarters and have been repeat-
ing themselves yearly. 
Since also the possible explanatory factors for borrowing were available on 
yearly basis (as flow variables) and they could be interpreted and identified also 
yearly it was reasonable to transform the original data set to a yearly flow time 
series. Accordingly, a weighted average of borrowing was computed for each 
year based on the quarterly data where the first and last observation had a relative 
weight of 0.5. 
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Figure 2. Local governments’ borrowing between 1990Q1–2011Q1 (in billion HUF)
Source: own construction based on Hungarian National Bank’s data
(http://www.mnb.hu/Statisztika/statisztikai-adatok-informaciok/adatok-idosorok/xi-puszam-
lak/mnbhu_nemz_modsz_idosorok090107, access: 12.08.2012)
Table 1
Autocorrelation function of borrowing (quarterly data)
Source: own construction.
LAG ACF PACF Q–stat. p–value
1 –0,1573 –0,1573 2,1796 0,140
2 –0,0204 –0,0463 2,2168 0,330
3 –0,2067 –0,2233 6,0693 0,108
4 0,6940 0,6717 50,0466 0,000
5 –0,1170 –0,0035 51,3123 0,000
6 0,0539 0,1216 51,5844 0,000
7 –0,1645 0,0942 54,1501 0,000
Figure 3. Local governments’ yearly borrowing (flow data) between 1990–2010
Source: own construction based on own calculation.
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Regression model
As it is obvious according to the chart in case of the yearly data set a clear trend 
can be identified with a dominant upward tendency which reached a peak of 
about 250 billion HUF in 2008. In order to determine and explain the changes 
in borrowing activity a multiple linear regression model was carried out where 
the explanatory (independent) variables were identified based on the theoretical 
background discussed in the previous section. 
Independent variables (X jt)
Local governments’ total revenues (Revenues)
Local governments’ total expenditures (Expenditures)
Local governments’ capital expenditures (Investments)
Central Bank Base Rate (CBBR)2
GDP of Hungary (GDP)
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Dependent variable (Y
t
)
Borrowing (yearly)
Using the ordinary least squares method (OLS) the model seemed to be sig-
nificant (p-value for overall F-test was 0.0006) and it had a quite good fit to 
borrowing data (R2 = 0.7729) however at 5% of significance neither explanatory 
variables were significant. 
Table 2
Regression coefficients
Source: own construction.
Testing the theoretical assumption for the linear model also indicated that 
the model cannot be considered as adequate because among others errors terms 
followed not a normal distribution and even autocorrelation was present. As 
a conclusion it could be stated that although borrowing depends on the chosen 
2 It was calculated as a duration-weigthed average for cases where CBBR was not constant for 
the whole year.
cCoefficient sStd. error t-ratio p-value
Const. –750,007 321,218 –2,335 0,0350**
Revenues 0,199922 0,296992 0,6732 0,5118
Expenditures –0,118335 0,334478 –0,3538 0,7288
Investments 0,137304 0,387849 0,3540 0,7286
Central_Bank_Ba 0,597270 3,77596 0,1582 0,8766
GDP –3,29367e-06 0,000227268 0,01449 0,9886
CPI 5,31362 2,73173 1,945 0,0721*
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explanatory factors (except for GDP) but as a model they are not able to pro-
vide sufficient explanation for borrowing in time. As possible reasons the role of 
random factors and the effect of previous behaviour (behaviour patterns) could 
be mentioned. In order to test the validity of the previous hypothesis I tried to 
identify an Autoregressive Moving Average Model (ARIMA) for the time series.
Table 3
Correlation coefficients, using the observations 1990–20103
Borrowing Revenues Expendi- tures
Invest- 
ments
Central_
Bank_
Base Rate
GDP CPI
1,0000 0,8288 0,8273 0,8002 –0,6890 0,3785 –0,6212 Borrowing
1,0000 0,9988 0,9816 –0,9158 0,4374 –0,9045 Revenues
1,0000 0,9876 –0,9204 0,4635 –0,9017 Expenditures
1,0000 –0,9267 0,4942 –0,9056 Investments
1,0000 –0,4272 0,9110 Central_ Bank_Base_Rate
1,00000 –0,3379 GDP
1,0000 CPI
Source: own construction.
3 At 5% level of significance critical value (two-tailed) = 0.4329 for n = 21.
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Figure 4. The formation of the value of explanatory variables (1990–2010)
Source: own construction.
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Autoregressive Moving Average Model
The ARIMA procedure can help with analyzing and forecasting our data on bor-
rowing by predicting a value in the response time series as a linear combination 
of its own past values, past errors (also called shocks or innovations), and current 
and past values of other time series:
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2... ...t t t t q t q t t p t pY Y Y Yε ϕ ε ϕ ε ϕ ε Θ Θ Θ− − − − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅
The input series for ARIMA needs to be stationary, that is, it should have 
a constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation through time. However based on 
the line-chart (see: Figure 3) a clear upward trend was identified in our time se-
ries and the same conclusion could be drawn according to the autocorrelogram 
as well. 
Figure 5. Autocorrelogram for Borrowing
Source: own construction.
Therefore, the series first needs to be differenced until it is stationary. The 
number of times the series needs to be differenced to achieve stationarity is re-
flected in the d parameter. According to the plot of borrowing and the autocorre-
logram our time series requires only first order non seasonal (lag=1) differencing. 
As it can be seen above the p-values of Ljung-Box Q test and the autocor-
relogram supported that the first-difference series of borrowing (d_Borrowing) 
becomes stationary. At this stage we are already be able to decide how many 
autoregressive (p) and moving average (q) parameters are necessary to yield an 
effective but still parsimonious model of the process.4 Since in practice the num-
bers of the p or q parameters very rarely need to be greater than 2 as the firs step 
only four possible combinations of the models (p=0, q=0; p=0, q=1; p=1, q=0; 
4 Parsimonious means that it has the fewest parameters and greatest number of degrees of free-
dom among all models that fit the data.
 ACF for Borrowing
PACF for Borrowing
1
0,5
–0,5
–1
0
1
0,5
–0,5
–1
0
0 42 3 8761 5
0 42 3 8761 5
lag
lag
+− 1,96/T^0,5
+− 1,96/T^0,5
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ACF for d_Borrowing
PACF for d_Borrowing
1
0,5
–0,5
–1
0
0 42 3 761 5
lag
+− 1,96/T^0,5
+− 1,96/T^0,5
1
0,5
–0,5
–1
0
0 42 3 761 5
lag
LAG ACF PACF Q-stat. p-value
1 –0,2156 –0,2156 1,0761 0,300
2 0,0206 –0,0271 1,0865 0,581
3 –0,1419 –0,1503 1,6080 0,658
4 –0,0882 –0,1626 1,8220 0,768
5 0,0648 0,0017 1,9451 0,857
6 0,0117 –0,0012 1,9494 0,924
7 –0,0978 –0,1436 2,2731 0,943
Table 4
Autocorrelation function for d_Borrowing
Figure 6. Autocorrelogram for first order differencing of Borrowing
Source: own construction.
Source: own construction.
p=1, q=1) were compared. Among the examined models the following mixed 
model – ARIMA (1,1,1) – seemed to be suitable:
1 1 2 18.37884 0.625454 ( ) 0.99999t t t t tY Y Y Y ε− − − −= + + ⋅ − − ⋅
As Table 5 shows all the coefficients of the model are significant at a very low 
level of significance and since the variance estimate, AIC (Akaike information 
criterion), and SBC (Schwarz’s Bayesian criterion) are all smaller than they were 
for the other models indicated that the ARIMA(1,1,1) model fits the data better 
without over-parameterizing.
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Table 5
Statistical output for ARIMA(1,1,1) 
Source: own calculation.5
Although the hypothesis that error terms follow a normal distribution had to 
be rejected at a level of 5% of significance (p-value=0.00004), the second impor-
tant group of assumption of ARIMA model was met that is no significant auto-
correlations and partial autocorrelations could be detected for the residuals. That 
is there is a strong evidence that the ARIMA(1,1,1) is suitable for our time series. 
Table 6
Residual autocorrelation function
Source: own construction.
As the practical extrapolation of the time series model to the borrowing of 
Hungarian local governments the following conclusion can be drawn: Local au-
5 Using Kalman-filter (linear quadratic estimation, LQE), standard errors estimated based on 
Hessian matrix.
Coefficient Std. error z p-value
Const. 8,37884 2,64271 3,1706 0,00152
phi_1 0,625454 0,198704 3,1477 0,00165
theta_1 –0,999999 0,151614 –6,5957 <0,00001
Akaike criterion (AIC) 
206,7956
Schwarz criterion (SBC) 
210,7786
Real Imaginary Modulus Frequency
AR
Root 1 1,5988 0,0000 1,5988 0,0000
MA
Root 1 1,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,0000
LAG ACF PACF Q-stat. p-value
1 –0,0430 –0,0430 0,0427 0,836
2 0,0922 0,0905 0,2506 0,882
3 –0,0850 –0,0783 0,4378 0,932
4 –0,0652 –0,0807 0,5548 0,968
5 0,0480 0,0588 0,6222 0,987
6 –0,0109 –0,0004 0,6260 0,996
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thorities’ borrowing activity cannot be explained only with help of quantitative 
macro-economical indicators such as total subnational revenues, expenditures, 
CPI, GDP, etc. Namely, the formation of debt was mainly determined by beha- 
viour patterns of local governments and by random (unforeseeable) shocks caused 
by changes in central regulation. The short term patterns in borrowing attitude 
are due to the four-year long election cycle of local representatives while adapting 
to random shock happens quickly within one year (and this is the reason for us-
ing lag 1 in model for error terms). It also means that in order to understand debt 
policy of the Hungarian local government sector the so called “shocks” need to be 
identified and analyzed. Accordingly, in what follows I try to determine different 
time-phases (periods), which can be described by different characteristics and 
makes explanation for the formation of local debt. 
Local borrowing in Hungary: Stages of development and 
restriction
Early development of subnational debt markets (1990–1995)
The Act on Local Self-Government (1990/LXV) allowed the free borrowing – 
hereby also the issuance of bonds – of municipalities without the permission of 
Central Government. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s Hungarian local govern-
ments were reluctant to use loan resources because of the over-indebtedness of 
the previous socialism regime, and they considered indebtedness as a sign of 
weakness. Indebtedness started to increase only in 1993 rapidly firstly due to 
the investment needs of local infrastructure and to maintenance costs of assets 
privatized from the central government.
70
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Figure 7. Local debt between 1990–1995 (in billion HUF)
Source: own construction based on Hungarian National Bank’s data
(http://www.mnb.hu/Statisztika/statisztikai-adatok-informaciok/adatok-idosorok/xi-puszam-
lak/mnbhu_hazt5, access: 10.08.2012).
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Restriction (1996–1997)
Because of the national economic recession and high inflation rate as well as 
insolvency situation of a few local governments (Bakonszeg, Nágocs, Páty, 
Bátorliget) strict restrictive measure took effect concerning local borrowing in 
1995. Amending the Act on Local Self-Government (1990/LXV) legal restrictions 
came into force and according to these, municipalities are not permitted to meet 
their debt service obligations from Personal Income Tax Revenues, Normative 
State Contribution, Central Subsidies or sales of Core Assets and total debt6 can-
not exceed the Corrected Current Own Revenues, which is 70 per cent of the 
positive difference between Current Own Revenue and Short Term Liabilities. 
Nonetheless, regulation – though unintentionally – left a loophole: the debt limit 
doesn’t apply to liquid loans. 
Another important instrument for regulation restricting loan financing of lo-
cal governments was the Act on debt settlement procedure of local governments, 
in other words the local government bankruptcy act. In 1996 the Bankruptcy 
Law for municipalities (Municipal Debt Adjustment Act, Law XXV) had been 
prepared and come into force. The law defines a debt adjustment process whose 
objective is to allow local governments to regain their financial health while at 
the same time protecting the rights of creditors. The Municipal Debt Adjustment 
Law defines and restricts the risk of investing in local debt by imposing a definite 
financial and moral cost on local governments who default on debt or other pay-
ments [Makay, 2004]. Consequently the local government bankruptcy act pro-
vides excellent basis and background for the assessment of credit risks of bonds 
but it cannot solve problems originating from the non-transparent financial report 
system alone and cannot substitute the deficiencies of other, alternate institu-
tional solutions of risk management.
Moderate Growth (1998–2006)
After the early and temporal “debt-boom” in the middle of 90s the size of indeb-
tedness started to increase considerably, first in 2002. One of the reasons was 
the favourable macroeconomic environment (low inflation rate, moderate inte-
rest rates). The increase was also due to the decrease of revenues deriving from 
privatized asset sale and the increasing investment demand could not be met by 
central government support. Since the EU accession in 2004 – insuring their own 
part in tenders – indebtedness has been increasing, though it has not exceeded 2.5 
percent of the GDP yet. 
On the 1st January 2002 the law on the “Capital Market” took effect and the 
decree on “Bonds” is of legal force also from the same date. Both measures 
indicated considerable changes within the regulation on local government bond 
issues. A very important argument for bonds in Hungary is that this way of 
6 Bank loans, municipal bonds, lease, third-party obligations and commitments.
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Figure 8. Borrowing of local governments in Hungary in the percentage of GDP (1995–2006)
Source: own calcultation based on Hungarian National Bank’s data.
financing does not require the local authority to announce public procurement, 
which decreases the administrative burden on the one hand and the issuer’s 
responsibility on the other. Regulation prefers unintentionally bonds to bank 
loans since public procurement process requirements do not apply to the issu-
ance of bonds.
Examining the features of municipal bonds issued by local governments in 
Hungary it can be stated that almost all bonds were placed privately and the buy-
ers were only commercial banks. Municipal bond therefore could be considered 
as bank loans in disguise. One possible explanation for it can be that in Hungary 
the method of capital market financing is a less accepted and widespread solu-
tion than borrowing from a bank. That is the issuer local governments – in case 
this alternative have been considered at all– have not taken the risk of remaining 
without buyers even if the public issue is of much higher administrative burden. 
Municipal bond-boom (2007–2010)
Compared to the mid-2000s substantial changes have occurred in the scale of 
indebtedness of Hungarian local governments in the middle of the first decade 
of 2000s. The extremely high volume of local government debt started at the end 
of 2006, caused primarily by the issuance of local government bonds. While up 
to 8 billion HUF worth of bonds were issued in 2006, the bond issuance value 
in 2007 nearly reached the HUF 200 billion and in 2008 exceeded this amount. 
Consequently the portfolio of bonds issued in HUF reached 50 billion HUF, 
while the value of those denominated in foreign currencies increased above 350 
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billion HUF7. According to the report made by the Public Expenditure Survey 
Committee, 20% of municipalities issued bonds in 2007 (among local govern-
ments that were audited by the Committee). At the end of 2010 the size of finan-
cial obligations deriving from local borrowing amounted more than 4% of GDP.
The wave of debt which started at the end of 2006 can be traced back the 
joint effect of various external factors. The government’s bill restraining local 
governments’ borrowing and the fear of restrictions were of primary importance 
among effective causes.8 The intent to counteract the stresses originated from the 
resource oriented system also had an effect on borrowing proclivity but it could 
not be only reason for bond boom. At the same time the GFS deficit situation 
is clearly not the only reason for debt. No firm correlation could be established 
between the deficit and the development of outstanding total debt in the years 
studied. In addition, the accelerated increase in debt cannot be attributed to the 
increasingly absorbent quality of EU funds either.
Figure 9. Bonds issued by local government sector between 2006 and 2008 (in million HUF)
Source: own construction based on Financial Supervisory Authorities data.9
The principal repayment of municipal bonds starts after passing of the grace 
period in almost every case. The investigation of the length of the term of the is-
sued bonds also shows an interesting result. The shortest term was 4 years while 
the longest was 25 years in the examined period, between 2006 and 2008. It is 
unequivocally clear that the terms of bonds increased compared to before and 
this increase was continuous between 2006 and 2008. While the average term 
of bonds was 16.73 years in 2006, it was 17.2 years in 2007 and 19.3 in 2008. 
According to the examination of the terms of each issue we can state that we 
7 Calculated at 176 HUF/CHF and 266 HUF/EUR.
8 Bill No. T/4320. for the modification of Act No. LXV of 1990, 9th November 2007. 
9 Note: calculated at 176 HUF/CHF and 266 HUF/EUR.
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cannot find bonds with terms shorter than 10 years. The term is 20 years for the 
most part. Nearly half the issues had such term in 2006 while the rate increased 
to roughly 60 percent in 2007 and in 2008. The appearance of the extremely long 
term issues is an important characteristic. 6 bonds with a term longer than 20 
years were issued in 2007 while 16 were issued in 2008.
Conclusion
In the early 1990s local governments were reluctant to use loan resources because 
of the over-indebtedness of the previous socialism regime, and they considered 
indebtedness as a sign of weakness. After an early and temporary “bond boom” 
in the middle of 1990s, the size of indebtedness started to increase considerably, 
first in 2002, where one of the reasons was the favourable macroeconomic envi-
ronment (low inflation rate, moderate interest rates). The increase was also due 
to the decrease of revenues deriving from privatized asset sale and the increasing 
investment demand could not be met by central government support. Since the 
EU accession in 2004 – insuring their own part in tenders – indebtedness has 
been increasing. The really drastic increase in volume of local government debt 
in Hungary started in 2006, caused primarily by the issuance of local government 
bonds. While up to 8 billion HUF worth of bonds were issued in 2006, the bond 
issuance value in 2007 nearly reached the HUF 200 billion and in 2008 exceeded 
this amount. From 2006 to 2009 the value of municipal bonds issued increased 
sevenfold and exceeded USD 1 billion. At the end of 2010 the size of financial 
obligations deriving from local borrowing amounted more than 4.6% of GDP.
According to the results of the empirical analysis local authorities’ borrow-
ing activity cannot be explained only with help of quantitative macro-economic 
indicators such as total sub-national revenues, expenditures, CPI and GDP. 
Namely, the formation of debt was mainly determined by behaviour patterns of 
local governments and by random (unforeseeable) shocks caused by changes in 
central regulation. The short term patterns in borrowing attitude are due to the 
four-year long election cycle of local representatives while adapting to random 
shock happens quickly within one year. Four different time-phases (periods) can 
be determined, which can be described by different characteristics and makes ex-
planation for the formation of local debt: Early development of subnational debt 
markets (1990–1995); restriction (1996–1997); moderate growth (1998–2006) 
and municipal bond-boom (2007–2010).
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